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Encouraging the Flow of Goods
and Know-How Among Nations-
The Role of Industrial Property
Rights and Antitrust Laws
Robert Goldscheider
HE PERIOD since 1892 neatly brackets two developments
in the realm of international law which bear directly on ap-
proaches to trade and the transfer of technology - the protection
of industrial property rights and
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influence and activities affect thi
the passage of laws designed to
regulate restrictions on free
competition. It is recognized
that no one factor, either public
or private, is of primary impor-
tance in shaping the modern,
interdependent world economy.
While not intending to mini-
mize the significance of the nu-
merous existing national and
multinational institutions whose
s phenomenon, it is nevertheless
believed that the two vehicles selected will provide some perspec-
tive in considering this general development. During the past
seventy-five years, the international protection of industrial prop-
erty and the antitrust concepts' have grown from infancy to wide-
spread acceptance; moreover, their continued significance appears
assured in the foreseeable future, although important changes are
anticipated if each concept is to retain validity in the rapidly evolv-
ing and volatile worlds of the technologically advanced and de-
veloping countries.
The major categories of industrial property rights - patents,
know-how, and trademarks - individually and in combination pro-
vide terms of reference which are almost universally recognized for
orderly trade in goods and services embodying one or more of these
SThe term "antitrust" is used in this article to describe generally the variety of
statutes and regulations designed to curtail restrictions on competition and the exercise
of monopoly power. When references are made to specific enactments, their scope of
application will be described more particularly.
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rights, as well as the transmission by license of the inventions, prac-
tical technology, and goodwill which these rights respectively sym-
bolize. The antitrust laws, originally almost exclusively a creature
of the United States, are also rapidly gaining recognition by gov-
ernments and multinational organizations elsewhere as a legitimate
instrument to promote desirable patterns of trade and investment.
Although starting from different premises, the two concepts are
complementary in many ways and frequently exert a direct influ-
ence on the extent to which the other may be validly applied. The
permissible limits of such exploitation are not only defined by stat-
utes, but also by the judicially developed doctrines of patent misuse,
acceptable ancillary restraints, unfair competition, and the rule of
reason. These have attempted to strike a balance between the phi-
losophies favoring "forward-looking monopolies," intended to en-
courage and protect socially desirable developments, and one major
aspect of antitrust laws directed against "backward-looking monopo-
lies," which have been described as "business commitments and prac-
tices that throttle the emergence of new technology, and the im-
proved manufacturing processes and distribution patterns made
possible by the legitimate exploitation of patent and trademark
monopolies. ' 2
I. BACKGROUND
Before embarking on this tripartite analysis - involving past,
present, and future - certain conceptual definitions would be in or-
der. Patents, know-how, and trademarks differ significantly from
each other. The modern patent system, which spans the entire
period under scrutiny here, rests on the rationale that patents are
exclusive privileges relating to a novel product or process and are
granted by a government for a limited term of years as a policy to
further the public interest by encouraging research and invention,
to induce inventors to disclose their discoveries instead of keeping
them as trade secrets, and to promote economic development by
providing an incentive for the investment of capital in new lines of
production.3
Know-how is a catchall expression, elusive to define. It encom-
passes a wide variety of unpatented manufacturing processes or
2 Timberg, International Patent and Trademark Licenses and Interchanges. The
United States Approach, in 2 CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN IAW 751, 752
(1961).
3 The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Cotntrics, U.N.
Doc. E/3861/ Rev.1, at 3 (1964).
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knowledge concerning the use and application of industrial tech-
niques outside the public domain.4 It may constitute a separate
body of information or be ancillary to the working of a patent. It
may include tangible materials, such as formulae, specifications,
written operating instructions, blueprints, patterns, technical records,
and manuals. Valuable know-how may also be intangible, such
as details of workshop or laboratory practice, technical training and
general workers' education, sampling techniques, and the results of
personal inspections.
Inherent in the concept of know-how is the fact that the lawful
possessor of the information wishes to preserve it from unauthorized
publication. This is not to say that all of this information is neces-
sarily secret; nevertheless, the combination of elements involved
must not be readily available to someone reasonably knowledgeable
in that field of activity. Exclusive ownership is not indispensable
to recognition of property rights in know-how. If knowledge is
independently acquired by several people, each of whom has pre-
served such information from publication, they may each derive
rights from the information.5
Trademarks may be defined as words or symbols, alone and in
combination, which distinguish the goods or services of one trader
from those of its competitor. Distinctiveness in relation to specified
goods is the usual criterion for obtaining registrations of trademarks,
which provide the proprietor thereof with certain statutory advan-
tages in proceeding against others who attempt to use confusingly
similar marks. The protection afforded trademarks does not trace
its beginning to an intent to reward or confer a monopoly right
upon the owner thereof; rather, trademarks were originally designed
to protect consumers by identifying genuine goods from a particular
source, thereby avoiding confusion and deception.6 Trademarks
do not have an existence independent of the business for goods to
which, or in connection with which, they are applied, and unlike
patents, trademark protection may last as long as the business con-
tinues.
One final observation is needed. The laws that govern indus-
trial property rights, as well as antitrust laws, have usually been
4 Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, 7 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
RESEARCH & EDUC. 397, 398 (1963) [hereinafter cited by its new name: IDEA].
5 Ibid.
6 See Timberg, supra note 2, at 751 n.1 who in turn cites CHAMBERLA N, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56-70, 246-50 (5th ed. 1946) and Brown,
Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
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national enactments or judicial pronouncements, directed primarily
to questions of domestic application. They have nevertheless in-
creasingly exercised an influence in the international sphere by rea-
son of their inherent nature. Thus, while the avowed intent of the
patent laws has been to encourage invention in the jurisdiction of
the grant, patent monopolies soon exerted a defensive function on
the importation of goods which embodied elements falling within
the scope of the patent. Trademark registrations were similarly
used to restrict imports.
The national patent and trademark laws which were adopted
prior to the International Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property executed in Paris on March 20, 1883, the signatories
of which are known as "the Paris Union," and also later laws, sel-
dom contained express discriminations against foreigners, although
their capacity to acquire rights of industrial property were often
conditioned upon reciprocity.' The Paris Union went beyond this
in two important ways: it adopted as a fundamental principle the
doctrine of accessibility' and also greatly facilitated the possibility
both for inventors to obtain patents and for manufacturers and mer-
chants to register their marks in many countries. This is because
it provides, in article 4, that any person who has duly filed an appli-
cation for a patent or for the registration of a utility model, indus-
trial design, or trademark in one of the member countries of the
Paris Union shall enjoy, for purposes of deposit in the other coun-
tries, a right of priority. The period of priority for a patent is twelve
months, and that relating to models, designs, and trademarks is six
months. Thus, inventors and merchants are afforded ample time
to apply for protection of their patents and trademarks in other
countries of the Union, without being denied such protection by the
acts of third parties who might in the interval make similar appli-
cations. In the absence of these rights of priority, the requirements
of novelty in the various national laws could no longer be met in
the case of a subsequent application in a country where the patent
7 25 Stat. 1372 (1887), T.S. No. 55.
8 LADAS, T INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION or INDusTRIAL PROPERTY 9, at 16
(1930).
9 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20,
1883, Article 2, the first sentence of which reads:
Persons within the jurisdiction of each of the countries of the Union shall,
as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other coun-
tries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may
hereafter grant, to their nationals, without prejudice to the rights specially
provided by the present convention. (Translation published by the British
Administration in T.S. No. 55).
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law provides that earlier publication of the invention, anywhere in
the world, is a bar to patentability."0
This has profoundly affected trade, because the security pro-
vided by enforceable industrial property rights in many jurisdictions
has encouraged the proprietors of such rights to sell in those coun-
tries, and also to invest there, either directly or by granting licenses
to others.
The widespread acceptance of the Paris Union,11 which has been
one of the most successful international legal arrangements ever
concluded, reflects the importance of the Convention's contribution
toward the economic unity of the modern world. " In addition to
its function of regulating national laws, the Union has also con-
tributed to the harmonization of such laws and has even stimulated
movements toward multinational schemes for the protection of such
rights.
To understand the full impact of the American antitrust laws in
fostering trade and investment, one must look beyond their imme-
diate objectives of removing obstacles to interstate and foreign com-
merce to their more basic philosophy of stimulating development
by competition. It is the interaction of these purposes which ac-
counts for the spread of the antitrust concept, both on the national
and multinational levels.
H. FOUNDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS FRAmEwomK (1892-1917)
Two major events, which ushered in the modem concepts of
the international protection of industrial property and antitrust, oc-
curred just prior to the period under scrutiny; these were the afore-
mentioned establishment of the Paris Union in 1883 and the enact-
ment of the Sherman Act in 1890.1" Both represented responses
to needs that were recognized in the wake of the scientific and
industrial revolutions and the growth of commercial enterprises.14
During the quarter-century in question, the two events became ac-
10 The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries,
supra note 3, at 15.
11 As of January 30, 1967, seventy-six nations had adhered to one or more versions
of the convention. See BIRPI, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Jan. 1967).
12 Eckstrom, Industrial Foreign Licensing Agreements, in A LAWYER's GIME TO
INTERNATiONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS 107, 114 (1963).
13 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1964).
14 See Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 ABA ANTrrTRST
SECTION 14, 17 (1964).
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cepted realities and were also supplemented by measures which
strengthened and broadened their application.
A. The Paris Union
Since its adoption, the Paris Union has gone through seven revi-
sions, the most recent being at Lisbon in 1958. The second of
these revisions, following a Conference at Madrid in 1890-1891,
was ratified in that city on June 12, 1892."5 The Madrid Confer-
ence, which was the first such meeting that the United States at-
tended as a member, resulted in several important changes to the
original Convention. The Conference adopted unanimously the
principle of the independent status of patents, now incorporated
into the Convention as article 4, according to which the cancellation
or expiration of a patent in one member country of the Paris Union
does not lead to the cancellation or expiration of a patent for the
same invention in other member countries. The importance of this
provision to international investment and licensing is obvious, since
it permits a patentee to maintain rights in jurisdictions where it is
desired to exploit interesting patents, even if such rights are denied
for any reason, or allowed to expire through lack of interest, in an-
other member country of the Union.
This Conference also voted on the Arrangement of Madrid for
the International Registration of Trade Marks which was adopted
by a group of countries smaller than the full membership, since it
became dear that wider acceptance was not possible. The principal
feature of the Arrangement is that persons within the jurisdiction
of one of the contracting countries may, in all of those countries,
secure protection of trademarks registered in the country of origin
by depositing them at the International Bureau for the Protection of
Industrial Property.
16
The Madrid Arrangement was originally adopted in 1892 by
nine countries; the growth of its membership has been slow, and,
at the present time, it numbers only twenty-two adherents." The
15 IADAS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 51, at 91.
3661d. §§ 428-53. The International Bureau, now located in Geneva, Switzerland,
is presently known as the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property (Bureaux Internationaux R~tnis Pour la Protection de la Propri&6 In-
tellectuelle, or BIRPI).
17 Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France (with overseas departments and terri-
tories), Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Portugal, Roumania, San
Marino, Spain (and colonies), Switzerland, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Vietnam
and Yugoslavia. See BIRPI, INDUSTRIAL PROPBRTY (Jan. 1967).
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influence of the Arrangement, however, may be said to go beyond
its membership, since it serves as a symbol, if not possibly a model,
for multinational patent and trademark legislation that is the sub-
ject of widespread discussion. The United States has never been a
member of the Madrid Arrangement, although the question of its
accession has been raised on several occasions, including the present
time.18
Great Britain, a charter member of the Paris Union, also has
not joined the Madrid Arrangement. British patents and trade-
marks have, however, played an important role on the international
plane, since it has been possible to extend these rights to many jur-
isdictions which have been under the hegemony of the British crown.
The procedure has been to deposit in the extension country a copy
of the British patent (usually within three years after grant) or trade-
mark registration, certified by the British Patent Office or Trade-
marks Registry, as the case may be. This privilege was, and re-
mains, open to nationals of all members of the Paris Union, since
the basic British rights are accessible to them. It will be appreciated
that, particularly during the period prior to the First World War
when the British Empire was at its zenith, this system had a positive
effect upon trade and investment in the many jurisdictions con-
cerned.
The Paris Union grew steadily during its first quarter-century.
Following the accession of the United States in 1887, new members
were New Zealand (1891), Denmark (1894), Japan (1899), Ger-
many (1903), Mexico (1903), Cuba (1904), Australia (1907),
Austria-Hungary (1909), and Morocco (1917). Of the twenty-
two member countries at the time, only eight did not take part in
World War I. A leading authority commented about the activities
of the Union during this period, dearly illustrating the importance
attached to it by the member countries:
Not one country denounced the Convention and Arrangements,
expressly or impliedly. It is true that these acts did not retain all
their effects during the war. But in almost all the countries of
the Union, belligerent as well as neutral, several measures were
taken to preserve rights of industrial property protected by the
Convention. The war was a case of vis major, and was treated as
such. The measures taken purported to preserve vested rights
from forfeiture by the lapse of periods fixed by the law for the
performance of formalities or payment of taxes; to revest rights
forfeited for failure to comply with legal requirements by reason
18 See 56 TRAEMARK REP. 289-390 (1966), the whole issue being directed to-
ward the question: "Should the United States Adhere to the Madrid Agreement?"
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of the war; and to extend periods of rights of priority during the
existence of war. These measures benefited, generally, all foreign-
ers.'
9
B. American Antitrust Law
The development of the antitrust concept during the period
1892-1917 was an American phenomenon, but the international
application of antitrust law today may be directly traced to several
events during that time. Perhaps most significant is the fact that
section 1 of the Sherman Act was clearly established as a vehicle
of national economic policy to protect competition. This appeared
to some to be at variance with the legislative history of the act as
described by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Northern Sec. Co.
v. United States: '
The court below argued as if maintaining competition were the
expressed object of the act. The act says nothing about competi-
tion.... The prohibition was suggested by the trusts, the objection
to which, as every one knows, was not the Union of former com-
petitors, but the sinister power exercised or supposed to be exer-
cised by the combination in keeping rivals out of the business and
ruining those who already were in. It was the ferocious extreme
of competition with others, not the cessation of competition among
the partners, that was the evil fearedPm
The tendency to regard the Sherman Act as an instrument to
maintain competition had already been indicated in United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Corp.2s This landmark decision by Judge
Taft in the circuit court also gave rise to the so-called ancillary doc-
trine, by which a contract restraining trade cannot be enforced un-
less such restriction was merely ancillary to the principal, lawful
purpose of the agreement, and necessary to enable the convenantee
to obtain the legitimate benefits of his bargain, or to provide pro-
tection from the other party unjustly getting such benefits.2 By
striking down non-ancillary restraints, regardless of how trivial their
effect on competition might be, a guideline was provided for defin-
ing the permissible limits to the exceptions industrial property
rights constitute to free competition. Professor Brewster terms the
significance of the doctrine of ancillary restraints to foreign com-
19 LADAs, op. cit. supra note 8, § 54, at 95-96.
20 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
21 193 U.S. 197, 403, 405 (1904). (Emphasis added.)
22 Id. at 405.
23 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
21Id. at 282.
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merce "obviously enormous,"" when applied to restraints accom-
panying export, licensing, and investment arrangements abroad.
Another decision of lasting significance during this period was
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,26 from which the beginning of
the rule of reason is traced. From an even more basic standpoint,
it has been said about the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice White in
this case that
the real contribution he made was to establish that the overrid-
ing goal of the Act is the protection of competition as a national
economic policy.
To Chief Justice White, the purpose of the Act was to be the
preservation of a system of free enterprise, relying upon the forces
of competition to shield the public from the evils associated with
monopoly, evils which result from any "undue limitation of com-
petitive conditions," to use the language of the opinion. The
broad language of Section 1, coupled with the reserved power of
Section 2, he said, would be sufficient to prohibit any kind of pri-
vate conduct which could be shown to cause those evils 7
This is the concept that hasproven contagious and which has in-
spired a successful transplanting of antitrust doctrine in Europe. It
has overshadowed in international significance even the line of deci-
sions interpreting the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act over the for-
eign commerce of the United States. Indeed, in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co.." the first major decision interpreting the
Sherman Act under the foreign commerce clause, Mr. Justice
Holmes remarked that "it is surprising to hear it argued" that the
act should apply to doings "outside the jurisdiction of the United
States and within that of other states."29  This was a strict applica-
tion of the territorial principle that has been largely distinguished
in recent years." Until now, if a practice "inhibits a potential con-
tribution to United States export or import capacity, there may be
an antitrust problem."'"
2 5 BREwsTR, ANTITRusT AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABRoAD 5.4.2.1, at 87
(1958).
26221 U.S. 1 (1911).
27 Chadwell, Competition and Section 1 of the Sherman Act - Instant Antitrust
or Long-Run Policy?, 27 ABA ANTITRusT SEcTION 60, 61 (1965).
28213 U.S. 347 (1909).
29Id. at 355.
80 In Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cit. 1956), the for-
eign commerce jurisdiction was generally considered "to extend to all commerce, even
intrastate and entirely foreign commerce, which has a substantial effect of commerce
between the states of the United States and foreign countries." Id. at 641. See FUGAE',
FOREiGN ComwmcE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.7-.8, at 29-32 (1958).
31 BREWSTER, op. cit. supra note 25, § 7.3.2., at 160.
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Two other events relating to antitrust law in the United States
prior to 1917 also merit attention. In 1914, Congress enacted both
the Clayton Act82 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.88  The
former sought to prohibit specific restricted practices in an attempt
to eliminate uncertainty.8 4 Section 7 of the act concerns mergers
between corporations engaged in "commerce," which could include
foreign commerce, the effect of which "may be substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."8 5  This has not
yet been applied to foreign commerce, and, at least to date, the Jus-
tice Department has apparently not yet decided to inhibit foreign
acquisitions of competitors by American corporations.
The Federal Trade Commission has a mandate, with certain
exceptions, to prevent "unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."8 The Com-
mission, which has concurrent jurisdiction with the Justice Depart-
ment in dealing with illegal acts under the antitrust laws, combines
both investigatory and judicial functions in this area."
III. IMPACT OF PROTECTIVE LAWS (1917-1967)
The political and scientific events of the past fifty years have
tremendously expanded the volume of international trade and in-
vestment. A by-product of this has been an increase in the impor-
tance of the antitrust and industrial property concepts; these have,
in turn, exerted their influence upon the environments in which
they have been applied. This may be briefly illustrated in three
situations: the post-World War II reconstruction of Europe, the
early years of the European Common Market, and the international
effort, in which the United Nations has assumed a leading role, to
develop the economically backward areas of the world.
A. Post-World War II Reconstruction of Europe
International investments in the private sector may be made in
a variety of legal forms, which can be progressively changed as eco-
nomic and commercial relationships develop. If a manufacturer
82 38 Star. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1964).
84 See FUGATE, op. cit. supra note 30, § 13A, at 289.
85 Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
36 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
5 45 (1964).
37 See Dixon, The FTC: The First 50 Years, 24 ABA ANTiTRUST SECTION 29
(1964).
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wishes to gain a foothold in a foreign market, this may be done
through a sales agent who solicits orders on behalf of the foreign
manufacturer in return for a commission. Frequently, it is an en-
terprising merchant who brings opportunities in his home market
to the attention of the manufacturer. If trademarks are applied to
the goods and if advertising campaigns are undertaken, the manu-
facturer will be the beneficiary of the goodwill that may accrue to
the marks. If such trademarks already possess some sort of local
reputation as a result of publicity in journals, magazines, or other
media, this could facilitate the agent's efforts to introduce the prod-
ucts; as the reputation grows, this can have a "snowballing" effect.
As shipments to the foreign market become regular, a distribu-
torship might be considered more appropriate. In this form, the
local merchant would purchase and maintain a stock of goods and,
depending on the goods, establish a servicing operation.8  This
could require the transfer of know-how relating to repair and treat-
ment of the products, as well as the training of personnel. If trade-
marks are involved, they might appear on the premises and vehicles
of the distributor in addition to being affixed to the goods them-
selves.
A further stage could involve the local seller in manufacturing
operations, ranging from repackaging from bulk or encapsulating, to
assembly and finishing operations, or even to fully integrated pro-
duction. Thus, the discussion now focuses on licensing, in which the
local manufacturer will be "using," in the technical legal sense, the
industrial property rights in his jurisdiction which attach to the
products involved as well as the process for making such goods. If
the licensee ships goods from his country of manufacture, he would
also be using such rights in the export jurisdictions.
Frequently, the licensor holds equity in the licensee; this then
falls into the category of a joint venture. 9 These take a variety of
forms, depending upon the bargaining or financial strength of the
respective parties, and the political requirements of the host country.
Stockholdings may consist of minority, fifty-percent, or majority
interests. Sometimes the licensor holds this equity in addition to
the grant of a license, in which event he receives dividends, as well
8 8 The distinction between a "commercial agent" and "independent merchant" is
noted in the Official Notice on Contracts for Exclusive Representation Concluded with
Commercial Agents, 1 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 5 2697 (Dec. 24, 1962).8 9 See EDITORS OF BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, OWNERSHIP POLICIES AT WORK
ABROAD (1965); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., INTERNATIONAL
SuRvEy OF BusmNss OPINION AND EXPEmENCE, JOINT VENTulEs WrrH FOREIGN
PARTNERS (1966).
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as royalties and technical assistance fees. In other cases, the grant
of a license to use industrial property rights, the contribution of
plant layout and engineering services, and also the provision of ma-
chinery, are exchanged solely for equity participation. The ultimate
in this type of direct investment is for the original manufacturer to
establish a wholly owned subsidiary which exploits the industrial
property rights of its parent and, particularly in the case of patents,
is sometimes assigned ownership thereof. Many large corporations
have established a complex of subsidiaries which function with vary-
ing degrees of autonomy, depending on the philosophy of the man-
agement4
These were the basic legal forms of conducting business avail-
able to private investors and producers in the North American and
Western European countries at the end of World War II. All had
long been members of the Paris Union and were familiar with the
"common currency" which the proper use of industrial property
rights provides for trade and the transfer of technology. The de-
struction wrought by the war led European industry to seek arrange-
ments with American enterprises in order to gain access to their
technological knowledge and managerial skills. This, together with
the large capital resources made available to these countries through
the Marshall Plan and other public financial measures, enabled Eu-
ropean industry to reconstruct along the most modern lines and
rapidly to re-enter world markets as a potent force.4'
There were also reciprocal inducements for American compa-
nies, since the European markets were a fertile area for expansion,
the returns from which could help in the recovery of research and
development costs. In the years immediately after the war, most of
the European countries introduced strict foreign exchange controls
in addition to their existing tariff walls. Faced with the practical
impossibility of exporting to these areas, American businessmen
welcomed the opportunity to participate in these markets by manu-
facturing locally, thus making available their industrial property
rights in the various forms previously discussed.
But goods and technology were not the only American exports
at this time. Along with these innovations, many Europeans recog-
nized the positive influence which the antitrust laws had exercised
upon American business. The antitrust concept was originally in-
troduced into Germany by military authorities, but "paradoxically,
40 Ibid.
4 1 Ladas, Problems of Licensing Abroad, 1965 U. ILL. LF. 411,412.
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although decartelization was originally designed by the occupying
powers to reform the German political and social structure, it be-
came an article of economic faith with the subsequent German ad-
ministration."42
The 1957 German Law Against Restraints of Competition,
43
which was greatly influenced by American antitrust experience, in
turn exerted an effect upon the framers of the Treaty of Rome.
Moreover, many of the officials presently administering the Treaty
provisions relating to competition, received their original training
in the German anticartel administration, and also had frequent so-
journs in Washington.44
B. The European Common Market
Articles 85 to 94 of the Rome Treaty are included under the
affirmative heading "Rules of Competition"45 which reflects an at-
tempt on the part of the framers to complement in the private sector
the other Treaty provisions which envisage the removal of quantita-
tive restrictions and tariff barriers within the Community. Article
85(1) lays down the general prohibition against "all agreements
between ... [enterprises], all decisions by associations of... [en-
terprises] and all concerted practices which are liable to affect trade
between Member States and which ... [have as their object or re-
sult the prevention, restriction or distortion of] competition within
the Common Market";46 by way of example, the provision then ap-
pears to codify various per se violations under the Sherman Act.
Article 85(2) declares the prohibited agreements or decisions to be
"null and void."47  Article 85(3), which provides the possibility of
exemptions from the prohibitions of Article 85(1) to agreements
which have been notified48 to the Commission of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), represents a legislated rule of reason.
4 2 Timberg, United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws Governing International
Business Transactions, in A LAWYER'S GuiDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS 619, 640 (1963).
48 [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt 1081.
4 4 Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of Competition - Comparative
and International Aspects, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1962).
4 5 The Treaty is published in four official languages, French, Italian, Dutch, and
German which, respectively, employ the expressions "Les Rgles de Concurrence,"
"Regole di Concorrenza," "R~gels Betreffende de Mededinging," and "Wettbewerbs-
regeln."
46 1 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 5 2005 (1965).
47 Id. 5 2041.
48 "Notification" is the term used in Regulation 17/62 for the procedure of sub-
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Regarding the application of Article 85 to trade and the trans-
fer of technology between member states of the EEC, it has been
stated:
Under the Common Market antitrust laws territorial restric-
tions are definitely a restriction, distortion or prevention of competi-
tion within the meaning of Article 85, paragraph 1. One could
go even further. Since one of the objections of the Common Mar-
ket is to do away with artificial trade barriers such as customs
duties, import quotas, government subsidies, it is understandable
that any other form of privately erected barriers replacing the old
ones will be looked upon as fundamentally incompatible with the
Common Market. If it is permitted to be said that in the United
States the antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts have a
"complex" it clearly is one against price fixing.... The Common
Markets "complex" on the other hand, is one of fear of a resurrec-
tion, in whatever form, of trade barriers, especially where they
coincide with the geographical territory of the member States.
This explains the Commission's hostile attitude against territorial
restriction. 50
Article 85, the implementing regulations thereunder, and the rela-
tively few decisions interpreting them which have thus far appeared,
have given rise to a veritable torrent of scholarly commentaries.r'
This is testimony both to the significance of this development of a
meaningful antitrust law in Europe as well as to the large number
of agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which are affected.
As of the beginning of 1967, more than forty thousand agreements
had been notified to the Commission,"2 the majority of which were
either exclusive distributorships or licenses of industrial property
rights. The full impact of these provisions may not be seen merely
from these figures; many enterprises chose to amend their old agree-
ments by removing prohibited restrictions. Furthermore, the guide-
lines already discernible from the existing jurisprudence undoubt-
edly influence the preparation of the great majority of new agree-
ments relating to commerce in the Common Market.
In this connection, it appears that restraints upon the use of
patents and know-how which fall within the scope of the respective
mitting agreements, decisions, or concerted practices to the EEC Commission for pur-
poses of obtaining exemptions under Article 85(3). See ibid.
491d, g 2051 (1965).
50 De Keyser, Territorial Restrictions and Expert Prohibitions Under the United
States and the Common Market Antitrust Laws, 2 COMMON MXT. L. REv. 271, 297-98
(1964).
51 See bibliographies, books, periodicals, and articles listed in 2 CCH COMMON
MKT. REP. 5 9901 (1966).
52Personal recollection of the author.
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rights or which are reasonably ancillary thereto, will be permitted"
and that territorial restrictions within the Common Market based
solely on patent rights will be recognized. The same will probably
not be true with respect to trademarks. There is a line of decisions
in European countries which did not permit exclusive distributors
to bar the entry into their territory of genuine goods bearing the
same trademarks;54 whether trademark licenses will be treated dif-
ferently is an open question.
There is a persuasive argument that one effect of Artides 85 to
94, as well as the various national laws designed to foster competi-
tion, will be the elimination of inefficient producers who have tra-
ditionally been protected, thus speeding the growth of larger eco-
nomic units in Europe.55 The growth of European enterprises is
being encouraged by governments and the Community leaders in
the belief that the greater resources which such enterprises will thus
be able to devote to systematic research will remove the major hand-
icap impeding sophisticated European scientists and engineers from
matching the technological achievements of their American coun-
terparts.
5 6
C. The Work of the United Nations and Others
As the European economy has recovered and prospered, the na-
tions of the North Atlantic Community, individually, in their re-
gional organizations, and as well as by virtue of their membership
in the United Nations, have turned increasing attention to the prob-
lem of modernizing the so-called "developing countries."'5
53 See the Official Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements, 1 CCH COMMON MKT.
REP. 5 2698 (Dec. 24, 1962).
54 Prins v. Grundig, International GRUR 259 (1957) (Netherlands); Philips A. G.
v. Radio-Import GmbH, 86 II BGE 270 (1960) (Switzerland); Maja Soap, Aussen-
wirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 203-06 (July 1962) (Germany). See Ladas,
Antitrust Law in the Common Market With Special Reference to Industrial Property
Agreements, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 709, 740-41 (1962); Ladas, Foreign Territorial Arrange-
ments and the Theory of Exhaustion of Trademark Rights, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 820
(1965).
55 See Adelman, An Economist Looks at the Sher-man Act, in 27 ABA ANTrrRUST
SECTION 32, 38 (1965).
5 6 Address by Mr. Lachmann, Annual Public Conference of the Patent, Trademark,
and Copyright Research Institute, June 18, 1965, reported in 9 IDEA (CONFERENCE
NUMBER 1965) 180, 185 (1965).
57 The U.N. World Economic Survey 1965-Part 1 defines the developing countries
as "all countries and territories ... [of Latin America and the Caribbean area), Africa
(other than South Africa), Asia (other than Mainland China, Cyprus, Japan, Mongolia,
North Korea, North Vietnam and Turkey) ." U.N. WoRLD ECONOMIC SURVEY 8, U.N.
Doc. E/4187/Rev.1 (1966).
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This has proven to be an infinitely more complicated task than
the reconstruction of Europe, involving cultural and climatic hurdles
every bit as formidable as the wide economic gap that exists. The
United Nations has recognized that industrial property rights can
exert an important influence on the development process."  In
1961, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to
prepare a report on the effects of patents on the economies of the
developing countries, including "an analysis of the characteristics of
patent legislation... taking into account the need for the rapid
absorption of new products and technology, and the rise of the pro-
ductivity level of the economies."59 The resulting study, entitled
The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries," emphasized the fact that patents cover only a portion of
the required information and realistically could only be considered
together with know-how. The report also recognized the impor-
tance of granting patents to nationals and residents of the develop-
ing countries as a means of "encouraging and rewarding invention
and technical progress,"'" but it termed ownership by foreign pat-
entees "the real issue."62
The enforceability of industrial property rights is generally con-
sidered to be one of the numerous "facts of life" if private invest-
ment is to be attracted. In many countries, in all stages of develop-
ment including some of the most highly industrialized nations of
Europe, a large majority of patents is owned by foreigners.6- 3 If
investments are made with a view to exercising such patents, the
advantages of the introduction of new ideas, import savings, possi-
ble exports of finished goods, and tax revenue to the host country
generally outweigh the expense of remitting royalties abroad. If a
patent in such a country is intended to be merely a blocking mo-
nopoly and is not worked, no royalty remittances result, and the
host country has remedies to avoid this abuse. It is therefore sub-
mitted that foreign ownership of patents in developing countries is
5 8 See the series of Reports of the Secretary-General, entitled The Promotion of the
International Flow of Private Capital, originally requested in GJ. Res. 824 (1954). Of
particular interest is the fifth such Report, The Role of Enterprise-to-Enterprise Ar-
rangements in Supplying Financial, Managerial and Technological Needs of Industrial
Enterprises in Developing Countries, 39 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. E/4038 (1965).
09 G.A. Res. 1713, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
60 U.N. Doc. E/3861/Rev.1 (1964).
611d. 5 306.
62Id. 5 307.
6 3 R OBBINS, INIDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RELATIONS WITH THE LESS INDUSTRIALIZED
NATIONS: AN ATTORNY'S VIEw 194-95 (1965).
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not merely a "necessary evil," but also has many potential advan-
tages.
Consistent with this view, the Secretariat of the Paris Union,
now known as BIRPI,64 published in 1965 a Model Law for Devel-
oping Countries on Inventions, which includes detailed commen-
taries by the framers about the proposed text. This effort, which
may be said to have been inspired by the earlier work of the United
Nations, 5 provides a number of safeguards to host countries which,
if equitably administered, should be acceptable to legitimate foreign
investors. With particular regard to the encouragement of invest-
ment and licensing, there are provisions relating to the protection
of technical know-how, including a declaration that use, disclosure,
or communication thereof without consent of the owner would be
unlawful.66 There is provision for compulsory licenses for non-
working product and process patents declared to be of vital impor-
tance for the defense or economy of the host country or for public
health.67 There are also requirements that license agreements, or
certain categories of them which involve payment of royalties
abroad, shall be approved by a specified government authority, "tak-
ing into account the needs of the country and its economic develop-
ment."
68
Although it may be considered that the developing countries
are not properly a place for antitrust laws since these economies fre-
quently cannot support more than one enterprise in a particular
field, the spirit of the Addyston Pipe case and Article 85 of the
Rome Treaty can be seen in section 3 3(1) of the Model Law which
provides: "Clauses in license contracts or relating to such contracts
are null and void insofar as they impose on the licensee, in the in-
dustrial and commercial field, restrictions not deriving from the
rights conferred by the patent."
BIRPI has also recently completed a draft model law relating
to trademarks in developing countries, in recognition of the contri-
bution of these rights in encouraging commercial relationships and
investments.6 " Local manufacture of a variety of industrial and
64 See note 16 supra.
65 adas, Comments on the Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions, in
STUDiBS IN LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 116, 118 (1966).
6 6 MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON hNVENTIONS §§ 53-57 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL LAW).
6 7 M ODEL LAw §§ 34-44.
6 8 MODEL LAW § 32.
69 See Offner, Draft Model Law for Developing Countries on Marks, Trade Names,
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consumer products in such countries is frequently unrealistic, and
the only way in which such goods could be introduced would be
by importing them through sales agents and distributors. In time,
a national or regional market may be created which would warrant
local production, in which event patents and know-how would come
into play. Until then, and also subsequently, trademarks and the
registration thereof perform their functions of protecting consumers
from deception, while permitting prompt enforcement of rights
against anyone who attempts to market goods or services with con-
fusingly similar markings or appearance.
IV. TRENDS TOWARD WIDER REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL ARRANGEMENTS (1968-1992)
The past ten years have witnessed the birth and growth of a
number of new international, multinational, and regional organiza-
tions, and it may be expected that industrial property rights and
antitrust doctrines, which have been factors influencing and being
influenced by these developments, will be responsive to the new
conditions being created.
In addition to the breaking down of national political barriers,
a new type of enterprise, the international corporation, has become
an increasingly important reality. Such companies, regardless of
their original place of incorporation, reach out everywhere in the
world for markets, techniques, ideas, personnel, and products. This
development is accelerated by the continuing technological revolu-
tion. Scientific advances in transportation and communication, au-
tomation, and new materials and processes, which not only require
huge expenditures on research and development but also are not
necessarily confined to any specific locality, have compelled com-
panies to seek technology everywhere, and to market the products
which result from it as widely as possible. 0 The effective and en-
lightened regulation of such international corporations can no
longer be handled by national legislation. Therefore, if the law is
realistically to reflect its environment, more regional and even
global jurisprudence may therefore be expected.
Returning to the example of the European Common Market, it
may be expected that the influence of Article 85 as an instrument
Indications of Source, and Unfair Competition - An Apprasal, 56 TRADMARx REP.
831 (1966).
70 See EDITORS OF Busomss INTERNATIONAL, THE CONCEPT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CORPORATION (1964).
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to limit private barriers affecting international trade will grow in ac-
cordance with the expanded membership of the Community. Thus,
the EEC rules of competition are already contemplated to apply to
Greece as a result of its Association Agreement with the Commu-
nity." It may be expected that the same situation will eventually
prevail with regard to Turkey and the association of the eighteen
states comprising the African and Malagasy Union,7' 2 as well as Ni-
geria, all of whom have negotiated a special status with the Com-
munity. Even more significant would be the acceptance to full
membership of Great Britain, which would be expected to be fol-
lowed promptly by the accession of several other European coun-
tries; this would nearly double the application of the principles of
Article 85 of the Rome Treaty. It could even be envisaged that
these antitrust rules might be extended to many of the members of
the British Commonwealth as a condition for their participation in
some Community affairs.
It will be interesting to see if Article 85 will treat an interna-
tional corporation as one enterprise or, assuming it has organized a
variety of subsidiaries and affiliates, as several enterprises. To date,
the Court of Justice of the EEC has refused to pierce the corporate
veil; it has tentatively given its answer by interpreting Article 85
"to respect the internal organization of an enterprise.""3 It is sub-
mitted that the larger concept must ultimately be recognized. This
may prove to be the province of Article 86 of the Rome Treaty,
which prohibits actions "by one or more ... [enterprises which]
take improper advantage of... [a] dominant position."7
The increasing volume of transatlantic commerce also raises the
question of collaboration between the antitrust authorities of the
United States and their European counterparts. The Department of
Justice has established a liaison office in Brussels with the apparent
intention of forming some cooperative link with the Directorate
General of Competition of the EEC, but the latter has, thus far,
pointedly eschewed any such collaboration in enforcement. In this
71 See EEC art. 238, 1 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 5 5344.16 (1965).
72 Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo
(Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. Treaty Establishing the African
& Malagasy Office of Industrial Property, signed in Libreville, Gabon, on Sept 13,
1962.
7 3 Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the EEC, 2 CCH
COMMON M-'T. REP. 5 8048 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
74 1 id, 5 2101.
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connection, an Advisory Committee to the United States Agency for
International Development has stated:
We recommend that the United States Government working
through its bilateral treaties of establishment, through the mechan-
isms provided by the OECD, or through other appropriate means,
widen and strengthen its collaborative practices with other gov-
ernments in the antitrust field. Wherever the activities of such
governments seem likely to raise the problem of multiple stand-
ards and jurisdictional conflict in the application of antitrust pol-
icies, a major objective of the collaboration would be to reduce the
uncertainty of the businessman concerning the jurisdictional au-
thority and antitrust standards which would apply in his overseas
activities.1 5
It is also likely that an antitrust concept similar to the philoso-
phy of Article 85 will emerge in other regional organizations, to
reflect the need to promote the free flow of goods throughout these
areas.
In the field of industrial property, the "ultimate goal" has been
described, by the President's Commission on the Patent System to
be "the establishment of a universal patent, respected throughout
the world, issued in the light of, and inventive over, all of the prior
art of the world, and obtained quickly and inexpensively on a sin-
gle application, but only in return for a genuine contribution to the
progress of the useful arts.""
Consistent with this, the Pads Union has traditionally worked
toward the harmonization of the industrial property legislation of
its members, and a trend which may be expected to continue has
already begun toward multilateral legislation. The "Office Afri-
cain et Malgache de la Proprit6 Industrielle" '77 has begun function-
ing and, aside from dividing among its members the cost of admin-
istering the system, affords registrants protection in a sufficiently
large area to be realistic from a production and distribution stand-
point.
Other regional arrangements may be expected, possibly with
transitory provisions, which would permit the concurrent continua-
tion of national legislation in the field. This is the approach taken
75 REPORT OF THE ADvISORY CoMMrTTEE ON PRIvATE ENTERPRIsE IN FoRBIGN
Am, FOREIGN Am THROUGH PRIVATE INTIATIVE 24(1965).
76 U.S. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, 'TIo
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TEcH-
NOLOGY 55 (1966).
77Created under Article 1 of the Accord Relating to the Creation of an African and
Malagasy Office of Industrial Property, done at Libreville, Gabon, on Sept. 13, 1962
on behalf of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast,
Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad.
19671 1637
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
in the Draft Convention relating to a European Patent Law," in-
tended initially for adoption by the six member states of the EEC.
This text has remained dormant, due to political difficulties, since its
publication in 1963. A similar text relating to trademarks has also
been prepared79 but the publication thereof has been postponed un-
til the fate of the patent convention is settled. The main problem
facing these arrangements concerns membership by non-Community
countries and accessibility to the European patents (and presumably
trademarks) by foreigners.
The Paris Union may also be expected to change. In the first
place, the accession of the U.S.S.R. in 1965 may be a forerunner of
greatly increased trade and technological exchanges with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe. In addition, the administration of BIRPI
is expected to be considerably formalized by the addition of various
advisory bodies, with the view of eventually launching a new orga-
nization to be known as the International Industrial Property Orga-
nization (IPO) which may ultimately become a specialized agency
of the United Nations."0 Another new organization, the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), estab-
lished in 1966,81 may also be expected to direct attention to indus-
trial property rights as they are applied to the developing countries.
Great as has been the development of the interdependent world
economy during the first three quarters of the century under review,
the demographic and scientific forces now in motion may be ex-
pected to accelerate change even further in the years to come. Hav-
ing matured into well-established international legal institutions,
industrial property and antitrust regulations should play an increas-
ingly important role in helping to focus and channel these creative
energies into responsible achievement so as to meet global needs
and aspirations.
78 See 2 CCH COMMON MET. REP. 5 5501 (1965) (for an English translation of
the Convention, see 55 5503-5724).
79 Id. 5 5501, at 4 606.
80 See Ladas, Proposed Reorganization of the Paris Union and the International
Industrial Property Organization, 56 TRADEMA.RK REP. 817, 824 (1966).
8 1 G.A. Res. 2152 (1966).
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